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Western participants endorse a higher number of positive traits as self-descriptive, but 
endorse a lower number of negative traits as self-descriptive. They also respond quicker to 
categorize positive traits as self-descriptive, but respond slower to categorize negative traits 
as self-descriptive. Is this self-positivity bias qualified by the cultural value of modesty? We 
induced modesty (vs. punctuality) and assessed self-descriptiveness judgments and response 
times among Chinese participants. We replicated the self-positivity bias in regards to both 
self-descriptiveness judgments and response times. In the case of self-descriptiveness 
judgments, however, the bias was partially qualified by modesty. Relative to control 
participants, those in the modesty condition endorsed fewer positive traits as self-descriptive, 
and manifested a tendency toward endorsing more negative traits as self-descriptive. In the 
case of response times, the self-positivity bias was unqualified by modesty. Within both 
conditions, participants were quicker to categorize positive traits as self-descriptive, and were 
slower to categorize negative traits as self-descriptive. The results speak to the relation 
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Approximately 40 years since its discovery (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; see also 
Kuiper & Roger, 1979), the self-reference effect (SRE) continues to generate theoretical and 
empirical interest. This SRE refers to superior memory for information (e.g., word adjectives) 
that is encoded under self-referent instructions (i.e., does the word describes you?) compared 
to other-referent instructions (i.e., does the word describe the experimenter?”), structural 
instructions (i.e., is the word long or short?), phonemic instructions (i.e., does the word have 
a rhythmic or lyrical sound?), or semantic instructions (i.e., is the word meaningful to you?). 
The SRE is attributable to the rich and well-organized representation of the self (i.e., self-
concept; Kihlstrom, Beer, & Klein, 2002; Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 
2013; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003), which enables better trait recognition and more effective 
source memory (Cunningham, Brebner, Quinn, & Turk, 2014; Klein & Loftus, 1988; 
Mitchell & Johnson, 2000). 
 The experimental tasks used to investigate the SRE have evolved over the years 
(Symons & Johnson, 1997; Turk, Cunningham, & Macrae, 2008; Watson, Dritschel, 
Obonsawin, & Jentzsch, 2007), but they have persistently focused on self-other comparison. 
A paradigmatic development relevant to the present work involves a task in which 
participants judge the self-descriptiveness, or lack thereof, of positive versus negative traits 
(Craik et al., 1999; D’Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005; Kwan et al., 2007; 
Watson et al., 2007). This trait valence variant (SRE-valence task) allows researchers to 
disentangle the endorsement of positive traits versus negative traits as well as the relative 
speed of such an endorsement (i.e., response times). Stated otherwise, the SRE-valence task 
allows for the examination of the self-positivity bias. 
The Self-Positivity Bias 
The self-concept is not only richly elaborated, but also positive. It contains substantially 
more positive than negative features (Kendall, Howard, & Hays, 1989; Ogilvie, 1987; R. M. 
Schwartz, 1986) both in Western and Eastern culture (Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; 
Gaertner et al., 2012; Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991). This high positivity ratio is, in part, 
bolstered by motivational processes. In both Western and Eastern culture, individuals are 
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corresponding motives known as self-enhancement and self-protection (Brown, 2010; Chiu, 
Wan, Cheng, Kim, & Yang, 2011; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). 
 The small literature on the SRE-valence task—all involving Western participants— 
has converged in showcasing the self-positivity bias. People endorse more positive traits as 
self-descriptive and more negative traits as non-self-descriptive (Kwan et al., 2007; Moran, 
Macrae, Heartherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006). In addition, when traits are positive, people 
claim self-descriptiveness more quickly than non-self-descriptiveness. On the contrary, when 
traits are negative, people claim self-descriptiveness more slowly than non-self-
descriptiveness (Watson et al., 2007). 
 A positive self-concept is linked to psychological health benefits and higher 
motivation for goal pursuit both in the West and the East (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009; 
Dunning, 2014; O’Mara, Gaertner, Sedikides, Zhou, & Liu, 2012; Rathbone, Holmes, 
Murphy, & Ellis, 2015). However, it is also linked to unrealistic goal-setting and social costs 
(e.g., exclusion) across the cultural Divide (Dufner et al., 2013; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Cai, 
2015; Sedikides, Hoorens, & Dufner, 2015; Sedikides & Luke, 2008). As such, it is 
advantageous for researchers and practitioners to know what the limits or boundaries of self-
positivity are. These boundaries can be intrapersonal, interpersonal, or (intra)cultural. 
Intrapersonal boundaries include introspection (i.e., one is less positive about oneself when 
reflecting on the reasons or evidence for holding a favorable self-view; Sedikides, Horton, & 
Gregg, 2007) and mental contrasting (i.e., one is less positive about oneself when mentally 
contrasting a positive future with a negative reality rather than when indulging in a positive 
future; Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). Interpersonal boundaries include relationships 
(i.e., one is less positive about oneself among friends than strangers; Tice, Butler, Muraven, 
& Stillwell, 1995) and accountability (i.e., one is less positive about oneself when 
accountable than unaccountable to strangers; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, & Dardis, 2002). 
Finally, and importantly for the purposes of the current research, culture-level boundaries 
may refer to the influence of cultural values (Chiu et al., 2011; S. H. Schwartz, 2006; Markus 












































In reviewing the relevant literature, Sedikides, Gregg, and Hart (2007) concluded that modesty 
“denotes a moderate self-view—seeing oneself as intermediate, rather than as very positive or very 
negative, on key personal attributes such as personality traits, abilities and skills, physical appearance, 
and social behavior” (p. 165). A prototype analysis in Chinese samples produced results congruent 
with this definition (Shi et al., 2015; see also: Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; Chen, Bond, Chan, Tang, 
& Buchtel, 2009). Modest persons are regarded as low-key (non-boastful, attention-avoiding), non-
arrogant, quiet (shy, introverted), authentic (honest), easygoing (agreeable), and magnanimous 
(gracious). (A prototype analysis in UK/US samples produced similar results; Gregg, Hart, Sedikides, 
& Kumashiro, 2008.) 
Modesty is valued both in the East and West, as it is linked to a prosocial orientation or relational 
harmony (Ashton et al., 2004; David et al., 2013; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 
2012), and it may be valued more so in the East (Chiu et al., 2011; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 
Sedikides et al., 2015). Modesty is thought to minimize a focus on the self and to encourage a 
broader, self-transcendent perspective (Exline, 2008; Gregg et al., 2008; Kesebir, 2014). As such, 
modesty may curtail self-positivity. 
Modesty and Self-Positivity 
Normative values influence the way members of a culture evaluate themselves above and beyond 
the influence of personal values (Becker et al., 2014, Kurman, 2010; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009), 
although typically normative values are internalized and regarded as personal (Chiu et al., 2011; 
Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007; Sedikides et al., 2015). We capitalized on the potency of modesty as 
a cultural (and not personal) value China in devising a modesty induction technique. Specifically, we 
presented Chinese participants with statements relevant to the value of modesty, and we instructed 
them to explain why the statements were true and how the statements guided them in everyday life. In 
the control condition, participants did the same with a value pilot tested to be less culturally relevant 
value, but equally personally relevant; this value was punctuality. Ensuring that the two values—
modesty and punctuality—differ in cultural relevance while being equivalent in personal relevance 
would add confidence that our findings were driven by culture-level (rather than person-level) 
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Specifically, they judged the self-descriptiveness of positive and negative traits, while we recorded 
their response times. 
We tested, for the first time, the replicability of the self-positivity bias (as assessed by the 
SR-valence task) in Chinese culture. In particular, we anticipated that participants would 
endorse more positive, and fewer negative, traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive 
(Kwan et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2006). Also, we anticipated that participants would respond 
faster to positive, but slower to negative, self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits 
(Watson et al., 2007). 
Importantly, however, we expected that these findings would be qualified by the cultural 
value of modesty. That is, modesty would attenuate self-positivity. More precisely, compared 
to those in the control condition, participants in the modesty condition would endorse a lower 
number of positive traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive, but would endorse a 
higher number of negative traits as descriptive than non-self-descriptive (Hypothesis 1). 
Furthermore, compared to those in the control condition, participants in the modesty 
condition would respond slower to positive self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits, 
but would respond faster to negative self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits 
(Hypothesis 2). 
Pilot Study 
We assumed that modesty would be an important cultural value and also an important personal 
value among Chinese participants. As we stated previously, normative values are typically 
internalized as personal (Chiu et al., 2011; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007; Sedikides et al., 2015). Of 
course, this does not imply that personal values necessarily reflect cultural values. Our goal was to 
identify an additional characteristic among Chinese participants that would be valued less than 
modesty at the cultural level, but would be valued as much as modesty at the personal level. The goal 
of the pilot study was congruent with the broader objectives of our investigation, according to which 
the cultural (rather than personal) significance of modesty would be primarily responsible for the 
attenuation of self-positivity. To that effect, and following consultation with colleagues, we selected 
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We tested 40 Chinese university students (23 female, 17 male), most of whom were from 
Chinese Academy of Sciences. They completed the study via an online survey hosting site 
(http://www.sojump.com). Participants ranged in age from 20 to 31 years (M = 24.78, SD = 1.91). 
They indicated (1 = not at all, 7 = very much), in counterbalanced orders, the degree to which each of 
modesty and punctuality (a) was valued as a norm by Chinese culture, and (b) was valued by them 
personally. 
Participants perceived modesty (M = 6.33, SD = 0.73) as a more valued normative trait than 
punctuality (M = 4.80, SD = 1.18) in Chinese culture, t(39) = 7.42, p < .001, d = 1.68. Modesty and 
punctuality ratings were unrelated, r(38) = .10, p < .539. However, participants perceived modesty (M 
= 5.35, SD = 1.23) and punctuality (M = 5.73, SD = 1.22) as equally important values at the personal 
level, t(39) = 1.44, p = .157, d = 0.32. Here, once again, modesty and punctuality ratings were 
unrelated, r(38) = .14, p < .400. 
In conclusion, we identified two characteristics that differed at the cultural level, but not at the 
personal level. Modesty emerged as a stronger cultural value than punctuality, but modesty and 
punctuality emerged as equally strong personal values, in China. Based on the results of the Pilot 
Study, we proceeded with the modesty induction, which included a punctuality control condition, in 
the main experiment. 
Main Experiment 
Method 
Participants and design. We tested 84 Chinese students (56 female, 28 male) whom we 
recruited form 16 Beijing-based university (mostly from Beijing Forestry University, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, China Agricultural University, and University of Science and Technology 
Beijing). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 28 years (M = 22.50, SD = 2.34). We deleted data from 
two participants, because they provided extreme responses (> 3SD)—a criterion we had set a priori. 
We randomly assigned participants to the two experimental conditions: modesty (N = 41) and control 
(N = 41). 
Procedure. We presented all participants with seven statements. In the modesty condition, 
we derived the statements form the Modesty Response Scale (Whetstone, Okun, & Cialdini, 
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“Modesty is an important value,” “it is not polite to boast oneself,” “no matter how good one 
is, he/she should not show off,” “I am a modest person,” “I don’t like to talk about myself; if 
I had to, I tend to apply to talk in a modest way,” “I prefer to praise others rather than being 
praised,” and “I’m always trying to be modest.” The statements in the control condition were 
identical, albeit we substituted “punctuality” or “punctual” for “modesty” or “modest,” 
respectively. Next, we allotted participants 10 minutes to write down at least three reasons 
why each statement was true and how they followed it in their lives. 
Subsequently, participants engaged in the SR-Valence task. It consisted of 240 positive traits and 
240 negative traits, which we selected from Anderson’s (1968) list. We presented the traits randomly, 
and one a time, at the center of a computer screen. We instructed participants to make self-
descriptiveness judgments (i.e., “like me” or “not like me”) by pressing the left key or the right key. 
We counterbalanced judgment type and response key order. Each word remained on the computer 
screen until participants responded to it (by pressing the key), while we collected reaction times. We 
randomized inter-stimulus intervals (fixation) between 800ms and 1200ms, during which we 
presented a central fixation. 
Results 
Modesty manipulation check. As a way of manipulation check, two independent coders, 
who were unware of condition or hypotheses, coded all participants’ written responses to the 
seven statements. In particular, the coders were asked: “to what degree do you think each 
statement is related to modesty or reflects a modest person?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). 
The coders’ ratings were highly correlated, r(78) = .89, p < .001, and we thus combined them 
into a single score. Participants’ written responses in the modesty condition reflected modesty 
(M = 5.92, SD = 0.60) to a greater extent that their written responses in the punctuality 
condition (M = 3.77, SD = 0.25), t(80) = 21.30, p < .001, d = 4.76. The modesty induction 
was effective. 
Trait endorsement. We entered participants’ judgments into a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-design Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA). Condition (modesty vs. punctuality) was a between-subjects factor, whereas 
trait self-descriptiveness (self-descriptive vs. non-self-descriptive) and trait valence (positive vs. 
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Overall, participants endorsed fewer traits as self-descriptive (M = 225.51, SD = 44.76) than non-
self-descriptive (M = 254.49, SD = 44.76), trait self-descriptiveness main effect F(1, 80) = 9.28, p = 
.002, ηp2 = .104. This effect was qualified by two double interactions (Table 1). First, the trait self-
descriptiveness × trait valence interaction was significant, F(1, 80) = 356.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .817. 
Replicating prior findings in Western samples (Kwan et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2006), Chinese 
participants endorsed more positive traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive, t(81) = 12.44, p 
< .001, d = 1.95, but they endorsed fewer negative traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive, 
t(81) = 18.41, p < .001, d = 2.89. Second, the condition × trait self-descriptiveness interaction was 
significant, F(1, 80) = 7.50, p = .008, ηp2 = .086. Participants in the punctuality condition endorsed a 
similar number of self-descriptive and non-self-descriptive traits, t(40) = -0.24, p = .815, d = 0.05, but 
participants in the modesty condition endorsed more non-self-descriptive than self-descriptive traits, 
t(40) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.85. 
More importantly, the above two-way interactions were qualified by the predicted condition × 
trait self-descriptiveness × trait valence interaction, F(1, 80) = 9.77, p = .002, ηp2 = .109 (Table 1). We 
broke down this interaction into two: condition × trait self-descriptiveness on positive traits and 
condition × self-descriptiveness on negative traits. We proceeded to subtract the number of items 
participants categorized as non-self-descriptive from the number of items they categorized as self-
descriptive, and then to compare the size of this categorization discrepancy between conditions. In the 
case of positive traits, the condition × trait self-descriptiveness interaction was significant, F(1, 80) = 
15.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .161. The discrepancy in the endorsement of positive traits as self-descriptive 
versus non-self-descriptive was lower in the modesty condition (M = 87.76, SD = 100.35) than in the 
control condition (M = 159.56, SD = 60.81), t(80) = -3.92, p < .001, d = 0.88. In the case of negative 
traits, the condition × trait self-descriptiveness interaction was not significant, F(1, 80) = 1.42, p = 
.237, ηp2 = .017, Nevertheless, we proceeded with exploratory analyses. The results pattern was in the 
predicted direction. The discrepancy in the endorsement of negative traits as self-descriptive versus 
non-self-descriptive tended to be lower in the modesty group (M = 142.78, SD = 84.11) than in the 
control group (M = 152.49, SD = 64.37), t(80) = -1.19, p = .237, d = 0.27. Taken together, participants 
in the modesty (relative to the punctuality) condition endorsed a lower number of positive traits as 
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higher number of negative traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive. The results were 
partially consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Response times. We entered response latencies into a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-design ANOVA, with 
condition as a between-subjects factor, and with trait self-descriptiveness and trait valence as within-
subjects factors.  
A significant condition main effect, F(1, 80) = 16.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .171, revealed that modesty 
participants (M = 993.10, SD = 255.08) manifested slower response times than control participants (M 
= 811.97, SD = 204.60). Also, a significant trait valence main effect, F(1, 80) = 26.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.251, indicated that participants responded faster to positive (M = 859.81, SD = 213.69) than negative 
(M = 936.87, SD = 217.04) traits. The trait descriptiveness main effect was not significant, F(1, 80) = 
.545, p = .462, ηp2 = .007. 
These significant main effects were qualified by two double interactions (Table 1). First, the trait 
descriptiveness × trait valence interaction was significant, F(1, 80) = 74.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .483. In 
replication of past findings with Western samples (Watson et al., 2007), Chinese participants 
responded faster to positive self-descriptive than positive non-self-descriptive traits, t(81) = 7.07, p < 
.001, d = 1.11, but they responded slower to negative self-descriptive than negative non-self-
descriptive traits, t(81) = 5.81, p < .001, d = .91. Second, the condition × trait self-descriptiveness 
interaction was marginal, F(1, 80) = 2.95, p = .090, partial η2 = .036. Participants in the control 
condition responded faster to self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits, t(40) = 2.05, p = .047, d 
= 0.46, but participants in the modesty condition did not differ in their speed of responding to self-
descriptive and non-self-descriptive traits, t(40) = 0.61, p = .544, d = 0.14. 
The predicted condition × trait self-descriptiveness × trait valence interaction was not significant, 
F(1, 80) = .41, p = .522, ηp2 = .005 (Table 1). Participant in the modesty (vs. punctuality) condition 
did not respond slower to positive self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits, and did not respond 
faster to negative self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits. Hypothesis 2 was disconfirmed.  
Discussion 
The self-positivity bias is prevalent in both Eastern and Western culture. The content of the self-
concept is predominantly positive across cultures (Gaertner et al., 1999, 2012; Trafimow et al., 1991). 







































MODESTY AND THE SELF-POSITIVITY       11
  
 
self-relevant information, and they detest, avoid, or neglect processing of unfavorable self-relevant 
information (Hepper, Hart, Gregg, & Sedikides, 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009; Sedikides & Strube, 
1997). 
One way to assess the self-positivity bias is through the SRE-valence task. People are presented 
with positive and negative traits, and they are asked to judge whether each trait describes them (“like 
me”) or does not describe them (“not like me”), while response times for each judgment are being 
recorded. People judge a higher number of positive traits to be self-descriptive than non-self-
descriptive, but they judge a lower number of negative traits to be self-descriptive than non-self-
descriptive (Kwan et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2006). Also, they respond faster to positive self-
descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits, but they respond slower to negative self-descriptive than 
non-self-descriptive traits (Watson et al., 2007). Given the costs involved in self-positivity (Alicke & 
Sedikides, 2009; Rathbone et al., 2015; Sedikides et al., 2015), researchers have looked into ways that 
it can be bound. We were concerned a culture-level boundary, namely the cultural value of modesty in 
China. 
Summary of Findings 
Modesty refers to an interpersonal orientation that reflects a moderate, non-boastful, and 
attention-avoiding self-view (Chen et al., 2009; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007), and is associated 
with prosociality or relational harmony (Ashton et al., 2004; Gregg et al., 2008). Importantly, modesty 
is likely to minimize self-focus and foster a self-transcendent perspective (Exline, 2008; Kesebir, 
2014). It follows that explicit inductions of modesty are likely to diminish the self-positivity bias. To 
ascertain that modesty reflected cultural rather than personal values (cf. Becker et al., 2014), we 
compared it with that of punctuality, a characteristic that a Pilot Study verified to be equally important 
to our Chinese participants at the personal level, but less important at the cultural level. 
Prior findings involving self-descriptiveness judgments on the SR-Valence task revealed that 
participants considered more positive traits, but fewer negative traits, to be self-descriptive (Kwan et 
al., 2007; Moran et al., 2006). We replicated this results pattern for the first time in an Eastern culture. 
Importantly, we proposed that modesty would qualify these findings (Hypothesis 1). Specifically, we 
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positive traits as self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive, but (b) more negative traits as self-
descriptive than non-self-descriptive. 
The results were partially consistent with the hypothesis. Modesty-infused participants 
manifested a higher discrepancy in their endorsement of positive traits as self-descriptive than non-
self-descriptive compared to controls. However, modesty-infused participants manifested only a weak 
(i.e., non-significant) discrepancy in their endorsement of negative traits as self-descriptive than non-
self-descriptive compared to controls. This latter finding may attest to the potency of self-protection 
motivation (Sedikides, 2012). It is very difficult for people to accept having negative traits, even when 
under the influence of modesty. The finding echoes similar results from the introspection literature 
(Sedikides, Horton, & Gregg, 2007; see also Cheung, Wildschut, Sedikides, & Pinter, 2014). People 
eagerly rate themselves less favorably when they introspect about the reasons for having positive 
traits, but they have great difficulty rating themselves less favorably when they introspect about the 
reasons for having negative traits. 
Prior findings involving response times on the SR-Valence task revealed that participants 
respond faster to positive, but slower to negative, self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits 
(Watson et al., 2007). We also replicated this results pattern also for the first time in an Eastern 
culture. We proposed, however, that modesty, once again, would qualify these findings (Hypothesis 
2). In particular, we hypothesized that participants in the modesty (vs. punctuality) condition would 
respond (a) slower to positive self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits, and (b) faster to 
negative self-descriptive than non-self-descriptive traits. The results were inconsistent with this 
hypothesis. 
Insufficient statistical power may not be a plausible reason for the disconfirmation of Hypothesis 
2. The experiment had adequate power to detect the triple interaction on self-descriptiveness 
judgments and the double interaction on response times, with the triple interaction on response times 
being far from statistical significance. A more plausible reason may be that an infusion of modesty 
suffices to attenuate some aspects of the self-positivity bias (i.e., self-descriptiveness judgments) but 
not others (i.e., response times). In particular, the induction of modesty involved judgment and thus 
interfaced squarely with self-descriptiveness, which also involved judgment: A judgment is likely to 
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modality, and, in fact, was incompatible with it. Here, induction of modesty via a response times task 
(i.e., asking participants to respond as fast as possible to modesty-related traits or behaviors) would 
insure compatibility. There is a third reason for the disconfirmation of Hypothesis 2. Whereas self-
descriptiveness judgments reflect the mechanisms underlying self-referential processing, response 
times reflect the outcome of such processing. As such, self-descriptiveness judgments may entail 
relatively deliberate processing, whereas response times may entail relatively automatic processing. 
The latter type of processing is likely to be more resistant to normative influences. Accordingly, 
induced modesty had more leeway to impact on deliberate and outcome-oriented processing (i.e., self-
descriptiveness judgments), but not on automatic processing (i.e., response times). 
Implications 
The modesty induction was partially successful in reducing the self-positivity bias. But why so? 
The infusion of modesty may have altered participants’ mindset or self-focus. Focusing on others 
instead of the self can lower the level of endorsement of positive traits or the denial of negative traits 
(Pahl & Richard, 2005). In that way, modesty may constitute an effective and implementable way to 
curtail the self-positivity bias and hence “quiet the ego” (Wayment & Bauer, 2008). Modesty may be 
an impactful method to attain a self-transcendent or other-focus orientation, along with such methods 
as self-compassion (Neff, 2003), an ecosystem perspective (Crocker, 2008), or a hypoegoic approach 
(Leary & Guadagno, 2011). This is arguably welcome news at an age of rising self-positivity (i.e., 
narcissism) in both Eastern (i.e., Chinese; Cai, Kwan, & Sedikides, 2012) and Western (i.e., U.S.; 
Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bushman, 2008) culture. 
Modesty attenuated, but it did not eliminate, self-positivity. That is, participants in the modesty 
condition still manifested the self-positivity bias, albeit to a moderate degree. This pattern of findings 
is consistent with the definition of modesty: it does not imply low self-esteem (Gregg et al., 2008; 
Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Yet modesty and self-esteem may partially overlap to the extent that 
the former reflects authentic self-esteem (i.e., securely rooted feelings of self-worth) rather than the 
overinflated pretenses of a fragile self (Kesebir, 2014). If so, the modesty induction may have curbed 
excessive self-positivity. Some researchers have argued in favor of the quality rather than quantity of 
self-esteem in people’s lives (Crocker & Knight, 2005; Franck & De Raedt, 2007; Hayes, Harris, & 
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advantages over self-positivity in influencing important outcomes. For example, people’s anxiety-
buffering capacity in the face of death reminders is contingent more on modesty than on self-
positivity (Kesebir, 2014).  
Our findings join a small set of experimental results that seek to clarify the relation between the 
self-reference effect and self-positivity (Kwan et al., 2007; Moran et al., 2006; Watson et al., 2007). 
These findings question the assumption that the self-reference effect (i.e., better memory for self-
referent vs. other-referent encoding) is solely due to the superior elaborative and organizational 
properties of the self-concept (Northoff et al., 2006; Symons & Johnson, 1997). The effect may 
additionally be due to processing of valenced information about the self (see also: Craik et al., 1999; 
Fossati et al., 2003), especially given the high ratio of positive-to-negative self-conceptions (Gaertner 
et al., 1999; Trafimow et al., 1991). 
Coda 
A handful of studies from the emerging field of cultural neuroscience (Kitayama & Park, 2010) 
have suggested that aspects of self-processing may not be as hard-wired as previously thought, and 
that they can be turned up or down depending on context. For example, Chinese participants show 
less of a self-other distinction than Westerners (Sui, Liu, & Han, 2009; Zhu, Zhang, & Han, 2007; see 
also Cai, Sedikides, & Jiang, 2013). Our findings complement this view. The self and objects 
associated with it may be “owned” (Cunningham, Brady-Van Den Bos, & Turk, 2011; Cunningham, 
Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008; Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2012), but modesty may 
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Table 1. Means (and SDs) for Trait Endorsement and Reaction Times 
 
Modesty Condition 
(N = 41) 
Control Condition 
(N = 41) 
Total 
(N = 82) 
 
TE RT TE RT TE RT  
Self-Descriptive Positive Traits 163.88(50.18) 912.00(203.88) 199.78(30.41) 715.72(154.83) 181.83(45.01) 813.86(205.22)  
Non-Self-Descriptive Positive Traits 76.12(50.18) 1031.76(285.68) 40.22(30.41) 860.87(227.19) 58.17(45.01) 946.32(270.52)  
Self-Descriptive Negative Traits 48.61(42.05) 1086.67(276.65) 38.76(32.19) 876.99(223.64) 43.68(37.54) 981.83(271.33)  
Non-Self-Descriptive Negative Traits 191.39(42.05) 941.98(213.29) 201.24(32.19) 794.31(168.49) 196.32(37.54) 868.15(204.95)  
Note. TE = Trait Endorsement; RT = Reaction Time 
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